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To Sever or to Destroy?: The Eighth
Circuit Allows Invalid Provisions to
be Severed from Otherwise
Enforceable Arbitration Agreements
Gannon v. CircuitCity Stores, Inc.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") allows for arbitration to be a medium by
which parties may settle disputes more expeditiously than litigation. The FAA
declares specifically that written agreements to resolve disputes through arbitration
are "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save2upon such grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract.,'
This language clearly places arbitration agreements upon the same footing as
other contracts. However, a profound circuit split has developed on the issue of
whether a written agreement between an employee and employer to settle all
employment-related disputes exclusively through binding arbitration remains
enforceable after a provision within the agreement is found invalid. Some circuits
have taken the position that inclusion of an invalid provision renders the entire
arbitration agreement unenforceable. Other circuits, however, have adopted the
contrary position, and have allowed an invalid provision to be severed from the
overall agreement, thereby allowing the remaining provisions of the arbitration
agreement to be enforced. This Note explores the split among the circuits on this
issue. In Gannon v. CircuitCity Stores, Inc., the Eighth Circuit addressed this issue,
and held that an invalid provision could be severed from an arbitration agreement,
effectively allowing the rest of the agreement to be enforceable.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In May 1998, Marken Gannon applied for employment with Circuit City Stores
at its store in Ellisville, Missouri.3 As part of Gannon's application for employment
with Circuit City, she executed the Circuit City Dispute Resolution Agreement (the
"Agreement") along with Circuit City. 4 By executing the Agreement, Gannon
agreed that all employment-related claims against Circuit City would be resolved
exclusively through binding arbitration. 5 The Agreement explicitly advised Gannon
to familiarize herself with the rules and procedures under the Agreement prior to
signing.6 Within the agreement, there were terms in bold type indicating to Gannon

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

262 F.3d 677 (8th Cir. 2001).
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
Gannon, 262 F.3d at 679.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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that the Agreement did affect her legal rights, and that she may wish to consider
seeking legal advice before signing.7 Moreover, the Agreement stated that Gannon
could withdraw her consent up to three days after signing the Agreement, and also
outlined procedures for how Gannon could effectuate such a withdrawal.8 Upon
Gannon's signing of the Agreement, Circuit City hired her.9
Gannon was terminated by Circuit City after approximately one year of
employment.' ° Gannon filed charges with both the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") and the Missouri Commission on Human Rights, and
Gannon received right-to-sue letters from both agencies." Upon receiving the
letters, Gannon brought suit in federal court, asserting claims under Title VII and the
Missouri Human Rights Act ("MHRA"). 2 These claims were based on allegations
of sexual harrassment, a hostile work environment, sex discrimination, and
retaliation.' 3
Based on the arbitration agreement Gannon had signed, Circuit City responded
by filing a motion to dismiss the case and to compel arbitration.' The district court
denied Circuit City's motion to compel arbitration, finding that the Agreement was
unenforceable because of a punitive damages limitation. ' Circuit City subsequently
filed a motion for reconsideration, asserting that it no longer enforced the punitive
damages limitation, and that another separate provision in the Agreement served to
automatically strike terms judicially determined to be unenforceable."6 The district
court denied this17motion, and Circuit City filed an interlocutory appeal, resulting in
the instant case.
Relying on general contract principles, the intent of the parties, statutory law,
and the public policy underlying the FAA, the Eighth Circuit reversed the judgment
of the district court and held the invalid punitive damages provision to be severable
from the rest of the arbitration agreement, which did not affect the validity of the
remaining provisions of the arbitration agreement. 8

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
It is well-settled that Congress enacted the FAA "to reverse a longstanding
judicial hostility to arbitration agreements... and to place arbitration agreements on

7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. Title VII is codified at 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e et seq., and the MHRA at § 213.010 et seq. of the
Missouri Revised Statutes.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. The punitive damages limitation in question limited recoverable punitive damages to five
thousand dollars. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. Such an interlocutory appeal is allowed under the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C.§ 16
(1994)). Id.
18. Id. at 683.
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the same footing as other contracts."' 9 Subsequent court interpretations have
developed a liberal federal policy in favor of arbitration agreements. 2° Substantively,
the FAA requires a court to enforce a written arbitration agreement as it would any
other contract." Specifically, the FAA states that written agreements to resolve
disputes through arbitration are "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 22 The scope
of the FAA was broadened by a recent Supreme Court decision, in which the Court
covering
held that the FAA's provisions apply to arbitration agreements
23
employment-related claims, such as that presented in the instant case.
On several occasions, the Supreme Court has addressed the issue of whether
statutory claims, such as those claims made by Gannon,24 may be subject to
compulsory arbitration. The Supreme Court has made it clear through a series of
decisions that "statutory claims may be the subject of an arbitration agreement,
enforceable pursuant to the FAA. 25 In the present case, Gannon argued that the
Agreement should not be enforced because it did not adequately protect her statutory
rights and remedies. 26 Specifically, Gannon argued that provisions limiting the
amount of recoverable punitive damages, as well as a "fee-splitting" provision
requiring the plaintiff to pay half the costs of the arbitration, should make the entire
Agreement unenforceable.27 Faced with arbitration agreements proscribing
statutorily available remedies, courts have either severed the illegal provision and
ordered arbitration, or held the entire agreement unenforceable.28

19. Gilmer v. Interstae/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
20. See generally Moses H Cone Metal Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
21. 9 U.S.C.§ 2 (1994).
22. Id.
23. CircuitCity Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001). In Adams, the Supreme Court held that
in the employment context, only contracts of employment of transportation workers are exempted from
the coverage of the FAA. Id. at 114.
24. Gannon's claims under issue in the instant case are based on Title VII and the MHRA. Gannon,
262 F.3d at 679.
25. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26. Since Gilmer focused solely on the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA"), the Supreme Court in that decision did not expressly decide whether claims under other
civil rights statutes are subject to compulsory arbitration. In Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113
F.3d 832, 837 (8th Cir. 1997), the Eighth Circuit did assert: "Title VII claims, like ADEA claims, are
subject to individual consensual agreements to arbitrate."
26. Gannon, 262 F.3d at 681.
27. Id. at 680. Under Title VII, a successful plaintiff may recover punitive damages up to an amount
of $300,000. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(b)(3)(1994). Under the MHRA, there is no limit on the amount of
punitive damages that a successful plaintiff may recover. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010 et seq. The
Agreement limits the amount of punitive damages that a plaintiff may recover to the greater of $5000
or an amount equal to the award for lost wages and benefits. Gannon, 262 F.3d at 679.
28. Compare Herrington v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 113 F.Supp.2d 1026, 1033 (S.D. Miss.
2000)(severing an unlawful provision prohibiting award of punitive damages), with Graham Oil Co. v.
ARCO Products Co., 43 F.3d 1244, 1249 (9th Cir. 1994)(voiding the entire arbitration clause).
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A. Courts Enforcing Through Severance
Courts finding severance appropriate rely on either general contract
interpretation principles, or the general federal policy in favor of enforcing
arbitration agreements."
In both Wright v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.,3 and Etokie v. Carmax Auto
Superstores,Inc., 3 the respective courts ruled in favor of severance based on general
contract interpretation principles. Arbitration agreements in both cases limited an
employee's statutorily available remedies.32 In Wright, several plaintiffs brought
claims based on Title VII and 42 U.S.C. Section 1981." Circuit City subsequently
filed motions to compel arbitration, relying upon the same Circuit City Agreement
considered in the instant case, including the limitation on punitive damages that is
the crux of Gannon.' In its holding, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama held:
Looking to the terms, nature, and purpose of the Circuit City arbitration
agreement, particularly the severability clause, the remedy limitations found
in the agreement were not so interdependent
with the other parts of the
35
agreement as to make them not severable.
The weight given to the enforceability of the severability clause in the Agreement
played a key role in the Wright court finding the provision in question severable,
rather than finding the entire arbitration Agreement voidable.36
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland reached a similar
result in Etokie. In that case, the district court again paid great attention to the
presence of a severability clause in the arbitration Agreement: "[W]hen this Court
considers the terms and purpose of the CarMax agreement and specifically the
severability clause, the remedy limitations... are not so interwoven with the other
terms of the agreement as to make them not severable."37 This approach, being a
reliance solely on the "letter of the contract" rather than attempting to incorporate

29. Compare Etokie v. CarmaxAuto Superstores, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 390 (D. Md. 2000)(relying
on a severance provision), with Herrington, 113 F.Supp.2d at 1032-33 (relying on policy favoring
arbitration agreements).
30. 82 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1287 (N.D. Ala. 2000).
31. 133 F. Supp. 2d at 395.
32. In Wright, such an employee was not able to enforce his available remedies under 42 U.S.C. §
1981 and Title VII, as there were limitations enforced by the Circuit City Agreement on his back pay,
front pay, and his possible punitive damages. 82 F. Supp. 2d at 1286. In Etokie, the respective
employee's remedies under both the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 were limited. 133 F. Supp. 2d at 395.
33. 82 F. Supp. 2d. at 1281.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1287. The following passage was in the same opinion which quoted an earlier Eleventh
Circuit decision as the fundamental rule guiding their decision:
When an arbitration clause has provisions that defeat the remedial and deterrent functions of
a statute, the prospective litigant cannot effectively vindicate [his or her] statutory rights,
thereby making the arbitration clause unenforceable.
Id. at 1285, quoting Paladinov. Avnet Computer Tech., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1062 (11 th Cir. 1998).
36. Id.
37. Etokie, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 395. CarMax is a subsidiary of Circuit City, and it utilizes the same
Dispute Resolution Agreement. Id. at 393.
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any policy arguments, represents the most conservative of the approaches courts
have taken to severance.
Other courts have relied more on a general policy favoring arbitration
agreements than on contractual interpretation principles in their decisions to sever
the offending provision. For example, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Mississippi in Herringtonv. Union PlantersBank, N.A.,3" held
that where the plaintiffs alleged their statutory right39 to recover punitive damages
was denied by their arbitration agreement with Union Planters Bank, the entire
arbitration agreement should be voided.40 The district court held that a waiver of
punitive damages in an arbitration agreement does not necessitate a voiding of the
entire agreement.41 Moreover, the Truth in Savings Act did not even clearly provide
for an employee's right to recover punitive damages in such a situation.42 Because
of this ambiguity, the plaintiff's burden of showing Congressional intent to
circumvent arbitration was not met, and the arbitration agreement was enforced. 4
Citing similar holdings, 44the court held that such a waiver of punitive damages could
easily be severed from the arbitration agreement without consideration of a complete
voidance.45
B. CourtsEnforcing Through Voidance
Courts that have rejected a call to sever the provision in question, and instead
have voided the entire Agreement generally rely on a different rationale. Some, as
the dissent articulates in the instant case, find that a contrary holding of severance
would give an "improper incentive" to employers to include illegal provisions within
the Agreement.' Others courts have found the agreement to be integrated, and thus
severance to be inappropriate.47 Still others, after analyzing the entire agreement,

38. 113 F. Supp. 2d. at 1032.
39. This right was provided by the federal "Truth in Savings Act." Id.
40. Id. at 1032. Specifically, Plaintiffs argued that the right to pursue said punitive damages was
afforded to them by the Truth in Savings Act. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. The court cited from the United States Supreme Court in discussing this burden: "If the parties
agrees [sic] to arbitration, they 'should be held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to
preclude a waiver ofjudicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue."' Id. at 1032., (quoting Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,Inc., 473 U.S. 614,628 (1985)). The court then concluded
that the plaintiffs would have the burden to show that Congress intended the Truth in Savings Act to
"override" the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act. Id.
44. The court cited extensively from Great Western Mortg. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222,232 (3rd Cir.
1997), finding that the Peacockcourt, upon being presented with a similar situation, found that a waiver
of the right to recover punitive damages did not affect the issue as to whether Plaintiff's claim was
arbitrable. Id. Furthermore, the court cited from Jones v. FujitsuNetwork Comm., Inc., 81 F.Supp.2d
688, 693 (N.D. Tex. 1999), which also severed an illegal provision that otherwise would have made the
arbitration agreement unenforceable. Id.
45. Id.
46. Gannon, 262 F.3d at 684; Perez v. Globe Airport Sec. Serv. Inc., 253 F.3d 1280, 1287 (1 th Cir.
2001), vacated,294 F.3d 1275.
47. Graham Oil, 43 F.3d at 1248; Armendariz v. FoundationHealth PsychcareServ. Inc., 99 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 745, 775 (Cal. 2000). "It is a well-known principle in contract law that a clause cannot be
severed from a contract when it is an integrated part of the contract." GrahamOil, 43 F.3d at 1248.
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have found multiple offending provisions that needed to be struck, and instead of
striking them all have declared the entire Agreement unenforceable.4"
In Perez v. Globe Airport Sec. Services, Inc.,49 the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals clearly articulated the "incentive problem," and explained why the problem
made severance such an inattractive option:
If an employer could rely on the courts to sever an unlawful provision and
compel the employee to arbitrate, the employer would have an incentive to
include unlawful provisions in its arbitration agreements. Such provisions
could deter an unknowledgable employee from initiating arbitration, even if
they would ultimately not be enforced.5 °
Using this logic, the Eleventh Circuit voided an entire arbitration agreement that
contained a provision that limited an employee's remedies that were statutorily
available to him under Title VII.5 The Perez court cited an earlier Eleventh Circuit
decision, Paladinov. Avnet Computer Tech. Inc., 52 in support of its proposition that
a limitation on statutory remedies placed in an employment agreement by the
employer would "defeat the remedial purpose of Title VII," tainting and rendering
unenforceable the entire agreement."53
Three years before, the Paladino court had found two provisions in an
arbitration agreement sufficiently illegal in nature to warrant avoidance of the entire
agreement." Again finding the agreement "tainted" by these illegal provisions, the
Eleventh Circuit wrote that in the event of an arbitration agreement containing
provisions that defeat statutorily established remedies and purposes, the employee
is denied the opportunity to take advantage of all of his statutory rights." The court

48. Hooters ofAmerica, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938-940 (4th Cir. 1999).
49. 253 F.3d 1280 (11 th Cir. 2001), vacated, 294 F.3d 1275.
50. Id. at 1287. The California Supreme Court in Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare
Services, Inc., 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 745 (Cal. 2000) had also recognized this rationale stating that the mere
severance of one illegal provision "will not [deter an employer] from routinely inserting such a
deliberately illegal clause into the arbitration agreements it mandates for its employees if it knows that
the worst penalty for such illegality is the severance of the clause after the employee has litigated the
matter. In that sense, the enforcement of a form arbitration agreement containing such a clause drafted
in bad faith would be condoning, or at least not discouraging, an illegal scheme, and severance would
be disfavored unless it were for some other reason in the interests ofjustice." Armendariz, 99 Cal. Rptr.
2d. at 775.
51. Id. The particular provision required the parties, in the event of arbitration, to split the costs of
arbitration equally, in a "fee-splitting" arrangement. Id. Title VII allowed the employee to obtain costs
and fees upon winning the lawsuit. Id.
52. 134 F.3d 1054 (1 Ith Cir. 1998).
53. Perez, 253 F.3d at 1287.
54. Paladino,134 F.3d at 1061. Specifically, the provisions were in violation of Title VII, with one
provision failing to require the employer to advance the costs of arbitration, and the other sharply
limiting the plaintiff's remedies to solely those obtainable in a breach of contract action. Id. It should
be noted here that since the Paladinodecision, the United States Supreme Court has addressed the first
of the two illegal arbitration provisions in Paladino. See Green Tree Fin. Corp.- Ala. v. Randolph, 531
U.S. 79 (2000) (holding that an agreement that does not specifically require the employer to advance the
arbitration costs does not necessarily render the agreement invalid). However, the Perezcourt addressed
this possible abrogation scenario through asserting that the Green Tree decision did not affect the
"vitality of the primary holding in Paladino." Perez, 253 F.3d at 1287.
55. Id. at 1062.
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therefore felt compelled to void the entire arbitration agreement, due to the tainting
of the entire agreement by the illegal provisions in question.56
The Ninth Circuit took a different approach to void an entire arbitration
agreement in Graham Oil Company v. Arco Products Company.57 In Graham Oil,
the court voided an arbitration agreement where several of the Plaintiffs statutory
rights were limited.5" The court's holding asserted: "because the arbitration clause
employed by ARCO compels Graham Oil to surrender important statutorilymandated rights afforded franchisees by the [Petroleum Marketing Practices Act],
we hold that the clause contravenes the Act." 59
In reaching this holding, the Graham Oilcourt found that because the arbitration
clause in the contract between the parties was not isolated in nature, but rather
completely integrated, the entire arbitration clause must be severed. 60 In so holding,
the court decided that to merely strike the illegal provisions of the arbitration clause
would be insufficient as a matter of law.61 Citing a treatise on contracts, 62 the court
stated that defendants should not be allowed the opportunity to make an end run
around what Congress had expressly forbidden through its establishment of statutory
rights.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals also reached a voidance holding through
a different approach. In Hooters ofAmerica, Inc. v. Phillips,63 the court found that
several of the arbitration rules drafted by employer Hooters of America ("Hooters")
were invalid due to their requirement that employees forego substantive Title VII
rights. 6' The court rejected Hooters' contractually based arguments and held that
65
Hooters had created "a sham system unworthy even of the name of arbitration.
The court held that rescission of the entire agreement was appropriate because
adoption of these "egregious rules defeated the object of the contracting parties.""
Similarly, in Armendariz,6 7 the California Supreme Court also voided an entire
arbitration agreement, upon finding several unconscionable provisions.6 s In

56. Id.
57. Graham Oil, 43 F.3d at 1244.
58. Id. at 1246. Specifically, Plaintiff could not seek punitive damages at all, could not recover
reasonable attorney fees, and could not enforce a statutorily provided one year statute of limitations. Id.
at 1247. These rights were provided for Plaintiff through the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act. Id.
59. Id. at 1248.

60. Id. Specifically, the court stated that the arbitration clause was not a single isolated unit, but
rather a highly integrated unit containing three distinct provisions. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. (quoting John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts 478 n. 76 (3rd. ed.,
West 1987).
63. 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999).
64. Id. at 938-39.
65. Id. at 940.
66. Id. The egregious provisions included within the Hooters' arbitration agreement included the
ability of Hooters to: decline to file responsive pleadings, expand the scope of arbitration to any matter,
decline to file a list of witnesses at the outset, bring suit in court to vacate or modify the award, and
finally to control the mechanism for selecting a panel of arbitrators. Id. at 938-39. Each of these
provisions did not allow reciprocity on the part of the employee. Id.
67. 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745 (Cal. 2000)
68. Id. at 774. Specifically, the agreement included a sharp limitation on remedies, limiting an
employee's remedies solely to a sum equal to the wages said employee would have earned from the date
of discharge until the date of the arbitrator's award. Id. at 760.
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performing an analysis upon the California Civil Code and general California
common law, the California Supreme Court found that an arbitration agreement must
be voided if the central purpose of the contract is infected with illegality. 69 In
Armendariz, the court held that the central purpose of the contract was indeed
infected with illegality due to the numerous illegal provisions that constituted a
"systematic effort to impose arbitration on an employee not simply as an alternative
to litigation, but as an inferior forum that works to the employer's advantage." 70
Finally, there "was no single provision that could be stricken to eradicate the
unconscionable permeation from the agreement ' 71 and thus voidance was necessary
and proper.72
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In the instant case, the issue before the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals was to
73
decide on which side of this profound circuit split the Eighth Circuit would fall.
Specifically, Circuit Judge Pasco Bowman's majority opinion outlined the issue as
"whether a written agreement between an employee and employer to settle all
employment-related disputes through binding arbitration remains enforceable after
a provision within the agreement is found invalid." 74
The Eighth Circuit began its analysis with a discussion of the Federal
Arbitration Act, and the subsequent case interpretations of the Act which have
resulted in a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements., 75 The court
clearly stated its role in resolving the instant dispute: "Our role in determining
whether a court should compel arbitration is limited. We must determine simply
whether the parties have entered a valid agreement to arbitrate, and if so, whether the
existing dispute falls under the coverage of the agreement., 76 The court then
recognized the dispute at hand was one in which the overarching validity of the
arbitration agreement was questioned.77 Specifically, the court framed the issue as
one in which an otherwise valid agreement to arbitrate continues to be valid and
7
enforceable even when an illegal provision is identified within the agreement.
Circuit City argued that under contract law, the offending provision could be easily
severed, with the overarching agreement remaining valid.79 On the other hand,

69. Id. at 775. However, if the illegal provision or provisions in question are merely collateral to the
central purpose of the contract, then the proper remedy is severance of the offending provisions. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. For a review ofArmendariz, see generally S. Kathleen Isbell, Student Author, Compulsory
Arbitration of Employment Agreements: Beneficient Shield or Sword of Oppression? Armendariz v.
FoundationHealth Psychcare Services, Inc., 22 Whittier L. Rev. 1107 (2001).
73. Gannon, 262 F.3d at 678.
74. Id. It is interesting to note that Bowman did not limit the issue to one focusing an illegal punitive
damages provision, but rather delivered a rather expansive statement of the issue involved, as resolving
a situation in which any provision within the arbitration agreement in question is found invalid.
75. Id. at 679-80.
76. Id. at 680. The court continued: "Once we conclude that the parties have reached such an
agreement, the FAA compels judicial enforcement of the arbitration agreement." Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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Gannon argued that the offending provision rendered the entire arbitration agreement
unenforceable as a matter of public policy."0
In a narrow 2-1 decision, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
District Court and rejected Gannon's argument on both a contractual and a public
policy basis, holding that an illegal provision could be easily severed from an
arbitration agreement, and still allow the overarching agreement to remain valid and
enforceable as a matter of law. 8
A. Under Missouri ContractLaw, Severance Is Proper
In addressing Gannon's claims under Missouri contract law, the court began by
highlighting a particular governing provision within the arbitration agreement.8 2
Rule 18 of the Agreement "specifically stated the intent of the parties in the event a
provision within the agreement is found invalid." 3 Rule 18 provided that should a
provision be found to be illegal, it should be severed from the overarching
agreement, with the remaining provisions completely enforceable. 8"
However, the court continued its analysis by asserting that even had this
severability provision not been codified within the agreement, severance still would
have been proper under Missouri contract law. 5 The court cited the general rule
with regard to such a situation to be: "if the good be mixed with the bad, it shall
nevertheless stand, provided a separation can be made. 8 6 The court found that
indeed a separation could easily be made, asserting: "The punitive damages clause
represents only one aspect of their agreement and can be severed without disturbing
the primary intent of the parties to arbitrate their disputes. 8 17 Because such a
separation could be made without affecting the other provisions of the arbitration
agreement, severance was found to be proper under Missouri contract law. 8

80. Id.
81. ld. at 683.
82. Id. at 680.
83. Id. The court found this especially relevant due to the general rule that when a contract is
unambiguous, the intent of the parties should be determined from the instrument alone. Id. (citing
Marshall v. Pyramid Dev. Corp., 855 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Mo.App. 1993)).
84. Id. Rule 18 specifically stated: "In the event that any of these Dispute Resolution Rules and
Procedures agreed upon by the parties is held to be in conflict with a mandatory provision of applicable
law, the conflicting Rule or Procedure shall be modified automatically to comply... In the event of an
automatic modification with respect to a particular rule or procedure, the remainder of these Rules and
Procedures shall not be affected." Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 680-81 (citing Kisling v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 399 S.W.2d 245, 250 (Mo. App. 1966)).
Kisling in turn cited the general rule from an early Missouri Supreme Court decision, Koontz v. Hannibal

Say. & Ins. Co., 42 Mo. 126, 129 (1868).
87. Id. at 681. The logic expounded by the court here hearkens back to the Mississippi decision in
Herringtonand the Third Circuit decision in Peacock, which both stated that the presence of an illegal
provision has no bearing on the overall issue of whether a claim is arbitrable. See Herrington, 113 F.
Supp. 2d at 1032; Peacock, 110 F.3d at 232.
88. Id. The court also quoted extensively from Schibi v. Miller, 268 S.W. 434,436 (Mo. App. 1925)
to support this contention: "Where one provision in a contract, which does not constitute its main or
essential feature or purpose, is void; but is clearly separable and severable from the other parts which
are relied upon, such other parts are not affected by the invalid provision, and may be enforced as if no
such provision had been incorporated in the contract." Id.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

9

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2002, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 5
JOURNAL OFDISPUTERESOLUTION
[Vol. 2002, No. 2

B. Public Policy Also Requires Severance, Rather Than Voidance
Gannon's second argument was that public policy concerns override the
contractual rules discussed supra, and thus require a voidance of the entire
arbitration agreement.8 9 The court recognized Gannon's argument as invoking a
"narrow exception" that would prohibit severance in the event that public policy is
threatened. 90 Gannon's argument essentially invoked the court's holding in Perez
and argued that public policy would be threatened if only the provision was struck
instead of the whole agreement being declared invalid.9' Gannon also argued that
such a holding would also give employers an incentive to include improper terms. 92
Employees will be forced to either arbitrate under the illegal provisions, something
they may be reluctant to do, or go to court to have them removed from the
agreement.93
The court rejected Gannon's policy argument. 9" The court cites Hooters as an
example in which this exception may be invoked.95 However, in the instant case, the
offending provision is easily severable, and does not create a "sham system"
unworthy of the name of arbitration. 96 Moreover, the court hints in dicta that a
punitive damages limitation such as the one found in the instant case may not be
illegal in the first place. 97
Gannon also introduced general public policy arguments which the court
rejected as beyond the scope oftheir deliberations." The court again hearkened back
to the general federal policy favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements, stating
their rationale as: "In an evolving climate such as this, if we were to hold entire
arbitration agreements unenforceable every time a particular term is held invalid, it

89. Id. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed a brief in support of this proposition
as amicus curiae.

90. Id. This "narrow exception" is codified in both Schibi and Koontz, prohibiting a mere severance
of a contractual provision "where there is some all-pervading vice, such as fraud, or some unlawful act
which iscondemned by public policy or the common law, and avoids all parts of the transaction because
all are alike infected." Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.

94. Id.The court cited from White v. McCoyLand Co., 87 S.W.2d 672,685 (Mo. App. 1935), which
"embraced the proposition that only the state constitution, laws, or judicial decisions represent proper
evidence of public policy." Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.

97. Id. at 681-82. Because Circuit City did not appeal this specific issue from the district court, the
court declined to consider that question. Id. Furthermore, Circuit City presented evidence that it had
already amended the rules and procedures within its arbitration agreement to exclude the illegal
provision in question. Id. Nevertheless, the court declined to give up this strong "hint" against
necessarily finding a punitive damages limitation to be illegal, expressly stating its holding in Larry's
United Super, Inc. v. Werries, 253 F.3d 1083 (8th Cir. 2001), which held that the question of whether
a waiver of RICO punitive damages in an arbitration agreement was valid remained a matter for
arbitrators, not the courts, to decide in the first instance. Id. at 1086.
98. Id. at 682. The court cited from Werries, in holding that their authority does not extend to the
consideration of public policy advantages or disadvantages resulting from the enforcement of the
agreement. Id. (citing Werries, 253 F.3d at 1086).
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would discourage parties from forming contracts under the FAA, and severely chill
parties from structuring their contracts in the most efficient manner for fear that
minor terms eventually could be used to undermine the validity of the entire
contract." 99
C. Senior DistrictJudge Vietor's Dissent
In his dissent, Judge Vietor commences by asserting how public policy was
violated in the instant case in the form of the illegal punitive damages provision."o
The minority then quotes extensively from the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Perez,
adopting the rationale set forth therein.' Specifically, Vietor finds fault with the
majority's rationale that "holding entire arbitration agreements unenforceable upon
the identification of an illegal provision" may undermine the arbitration agreement
as an effective part of contracts. 10 2 He writes that this argument is effective only
when applied to minor substantive or procedural provisions of an arbitration
agreement.'0 3 The instant case involves "a term that guts a major substantive remedy
'' 4
that Congress and the Missouri legislature chose to provide to employees, 1Gand
5
thus the entire arbitration agreement should have been voided.'l
V. COMMENT
Since the adoption of a strong federal policy favoring the enforceability of
arbitration agreements," 6 courts have disagreed as to what constitutes a valid
arbitration agreement. Specifically, courts have disagreed on whether the
identification of an illegal or offending provision within an otherwise valid
arbitration agreement necessitates no action, the severance of the offending
provision, or the voidance of the entire agreement. Faced with this dilemma, and the
existence of a profound circuit split across the nation, the Eighth Circuit in Gannon
v. Circuit City Stores, Inc. articulated the Eighth Circuit's approach to such a
situation, and in so doing, added "more fuel to the fire" of the circuit split.

99. Id. The court continues: "Such an outcome would represent the antithesis of the 'liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration agreements."' Id. (citing Moses H. Cone Mem '1Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.

Corp., 460 U.S. 1,24 (1983)).
100. Id. at 683. Judge Vietor stressed the "extreme" nature of the Circuit City limitation upon
punitive damages. Furthermore, he stressed as relevant the fact that job applicants are not told that the
limitation is far less than the amount recoverable at law. Id.
101. Id. at 683-84. It should be noted that the majority anticipates this Perez-basedargument toward
the end of their opinion through arguing that in being haled into court to defend an allegedly illegal
provision, a party loses much of the advantages of arbitration. Id. at 682.
102. Id. at 684.
103. Id.

104. Id. Judge Vietor rationalizes that such a major term affecting these rights is quite different from
a minor insignificant limitation, and thus should be afforded more significant implications in the event
that such a major illegal provision is identified within an arbitration agreement.
105. Id. at 684.
106. See generally Gilmerv. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,24 (1991);MosesH. Cone,

460 U.S. at 24.
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The Gannon court was faced with numerous well-reasoned opinions on both
sides of the circuit split, as discussed throughout this Note. Specifically, only
months earlier, the Eleventh Circuit was faced with a similar dilemma in Perez. It
was the Perez decision that served as a springboard for argument throughout the
majority and minority opinions in Gannon, as well as being the opinion that best
articulates both the opposing views of the circuit split. Perezalso acts as the essence
of the dissent's argument in Gannon. As discussed supra,the agreement in Gannon
contained a severability clause which provided a procedure by which provisions
subsequently found illegal would be severed, and the remainder of the agreement
would be enforced. An easy distinction could be made between the agreement in
Perez and other decisions that have voided the entire agreement, and those decisions
that only severed the illegal provisions: the former did not contain a severability
clause. However, this would ignore the main thrust of the controversy at hand; that
is, should public policy allow arbitration agreements to stand where an illegal
provision is included, with or without a severability clause?0 7
Because courts on both sides of the circuit split are clear that arbitration
agreements such as that at issue in Hooters'08 will not be enforced, it would seem
that the issue today is limited to the enforceability of arbitration agreements such as
that in the instant case; that is, an agreement with one or two identifiable illegal
provisions. Thus, the Perez court'09 provides the most complete and relevant test in
determining the enforceability of such an agreement: Is there an incentive created
which benefits the employer to include unlawful provisions in its arbitration
agreements?" 0
Given the rationale and the implications furthered in Perez, it would seem that
such an incentive is created, to an extent. However, it is important to consider that
this incentive could be sharply curtailed. Circuit City alone has been involved in
numerous lawsuits over the past five years with regard to the nuances of its
arbitration agreement." 2 An expanded collateral estoppel approach would seem to
be most beneficial in such a situation, allowing the Plaintiff to use a previous judicial

107. This logic is supported in Gannon itself, which seems to thwart any attempt of distinction on a
"presence of a severability clause" ground: "Even if the parties had not recorded their intentions in the
severability provision, Missouri law declares severance to be proper in this instance." Gannon, 262 F.3d
at 680. It should, however, be noted that the Gannon majority does recognize such a distinction in a
footnote toward the end of the opinion. ("We note that the arbitration agreement in Perez did not have
a severability clause and that the case is distinguishable from the present case on that ground.") Id. at
683.
108. 173 F.3d 933.
109. These sentiments are also echoed in Armendariz, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745.
110. See supra n. 50 and accompanying text. The Perez court lists the implications of this"incentive"
as follows: "Such provisions could deter an unknowledgable employee from initiating arbitration, even
if they would ultimately not be enforced. It would also add an expensive procedural step to prosecuting
a claim; the employee would have to request a court to declare a provision unlawful and sever it before
initiating arbitration. Including an unlawful provision would cost the employer little, particularly where,
as here, the arbitration agreement provides the employee must bear the employer's court costs and
attorneys' fees incurred in defending the agreement if arbitration is challenged and the employer
prevails." Perez, 253 F.3d at 1287.
111. See generally Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24; Moses H. Cane, 460 U.S. at 24.
112. See generally Gannon, 262 F.3d at 677; Wright, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 1279; Etokie, 133 F.3d at 390;
Johnson v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 203 F.3d 821 (4th Cir. 2000).
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decision with the same provision in the same agreement in a different case as
determinative of the provision's illegality in the case at hand. Such an approach,
even if merely shifting the burden of proof to the employer, would sharply curtail
the effectiveness of such an "incentive."
Courts addressing this issue will need to be cognizant of both the strong public
interest in maintaining a party's statutory rights, as well as the strong public interest
in advancing the interests and principles behind arbitration. A general rule that
allows illegal provisions restricting a party's statutory rights to stand would reject
the principles behind the former, while a general rule that rendered unenforceable
an agreement containing an illegal provision would not fully appreciate the
principles behind the latter. An effective approach would take into account the many
factors associated with this issue, in light of the facts surrounding the case in
question.
Included among these factors would be the relative sophistication of the
parties. 1 3 Associated with the "sophistication" factor is the extent to which the
parties understand the nuances and intricacies of the arbitration agreement they are
4
consenting to sign. The dissent in Gannon particularly concentrates on this factor.,"
Also associated with these factors is the extent to which assent to the arbitration
agreement is essential to being offered employment with the company. Judge
Vietor's dissent in Gannon also focused on this factor as being instrumental in his
determination that the agreement was contrary to public policy."'
The presence of a severability clause would seem to also be a factor to be
considered, as the court in Gannon pointed out." 6 However, as stated and discussed
supra in this section, this factor should not be determinative, especially in light of
the sophistication factors discussed above. Perhaps the most influential factor is the
ease with which the offending provision may be extricated from the agreement, and
the extent to which the provision's absence affects the remaining provisions. From
all accounts, the severing of the punitive damages limitation from the Circuit City
7
agreement in Gannon had little effect on the remainder of the agreement."
However, severing essential provisions, or numerous illegal provisions such as those

113. See generally Margaret M. Harding, The Redefinition of Arbitration by Those with Superior
BargainingPower, 1999 Utah. L. Rev. 857 (giving a scathing attack on sophisticated parties for having
undermined the principles underlying arbitration).
114. Gannon, 262 F.3d at 683. "Circuit City's counsel conceded at oral argument that job applicants
are not told that the punitive damages limitation is far less than the amount recoverable under the law."
Id.
115. Id. Judge Vietor writes of this factor: "The agreement to arbitrate was crafted by Circuit City,
not by the parties. Ms. Gannon played no part in drafting the agreement. It was presented to her on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis as a condition of gaining employment with Circuit city. She either signed or she
did not get the job. Circuit City's job application form provided to Ms. Gannon clearly states: 'Circuit
City will not consider your application unless the [Dispute Resolution Agreement] is signed."' Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. "We do not believe that the severance of the provision limiting punitive damages diminishes
[Gannon's] contractual intent to arbitrate because excluding the provision only allows her the
opportunity to arbitrate her claims under more favorable terms than those to which she agreed." Id. at
682-83.
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found in the Hooters case would summarily render the agreement worthless." 8
VI. CONCLUSION
Given the facts of the Gannon case, and the ease with which the offending
limitation was stricken in light of the attached severability provision, the court's
holding is a good one, even with consideration of a factor-based test outlined supra.
While the court did not pay very much attention to the sophistication factors, it did
consider the arguments made in the dissent, and deflected them with reason. Given
the strong federal policy interest in maintaining and advancing the policies
underlying arbitration, the Gannon holding will likely be a holding that more and
more courts will adopt as their own.
MICHAEL K. DAMING

118. See generally Hooters, 39 F. Supp. 2d. at 627. This factor would appear to invoke consideration
of the type of statutory right being threatened. It would seem that some statutory rights would be
considered more fundamental than others, and necessarily afforded greater protection and weight inthis
factor-balancing scheme.
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